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LOW-INCOME FATHERS, ADOPTION, AND THE 
BIOLOGY PLUS TEST FOR PATERNAL RIGHTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan Lehr and his girlfriend of two years, Lorraine, were 
expecting a baby.1  Lorraine told her friends, relatives, and the 
New York State Department of Social Services that Jonathan was 
the father.2  When Lorraine gave birth, Jonathan visited her and 
baby Jessica in the hospital every day.3  Then, after their release 
from the hospital, Lorraine and Jessica disappeared.4  Jonathan 
searched for his daughter, but each time he found them Lorraine 
and Jessica moved again.5  When Jonathan found Jessica a year 
later with the aid of a detective agency, Lorraine refused to let 
him financially assist his daughter and threatened to have him 
arrested if he attempted to see her.6 Jonathan hired a lawyer and 
filed a paternity petition, only to learn that Lorraine and her new 
husband had already instituted adoption proceedings.7 
When Jonathan requested that the court await the results of 
the paternity proceeding before ruling on Jessica’s adoption, he 
discovered that, despite knowing of the pending paternity 
proceeding, the judge had already signed an adoption order.8 
Although he identified himself as Jessica’s father by instituting a 
paternity proceeding, Jonathan failed to file with the state putative 
father registry.9  Because of this fact, the United States Supreme 
Court, applying the “biology plus” theory of paternal rights, held 
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1.  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983). 
2.  Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).  
3.  Id.  
4.  Id.  
5.  Id.  
6.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). 
7.  Id. at 252 (majority opinion). 
8.  Id. at 253. 
9.  Id. at 251.  
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that Jonathan was not entitled to notice of Jessica’s adoption 
proceedings, and Jonathan lost all rights to his daughter.10 
While Lehr v. Robertson is now a decades-old case in an area 
of law that changes rapidly, the case set a concerning foundation 
for determining the parental rights of a man who fathers children 
outside of marriage.11  In Lehr, the Court did not deny that an 
unmarried father could have paternal rights.  Constitutional 
protection of their parental rights extends to all parents, regardless 
of marital status.12  The Ninth Amendment and the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protect these rights.13  Court-imposed responsibilities such as 
child support payments extend to both married and unmarried 
parents as well,14 and those who fail to meet these responsibilities 
may be subject to civil or criminal penalties.15  These penalties 
may range from monetary fines to incarceration to involuntary 
termination of parental rights or, in the most extreme cases, a 
finding that no parental relationship ever existed.16 
While the percentage of children born to unmarried parents 
has declined in recent years, well over one third of all children 
born in the United States in 2015 were born out of wedlock.17 
Statistics show that significantly more African-American and 
 
10.  Id. at 251-56, 261-65. 
11.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275-76 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion 
“represents a grudging and crabbed approach to due process” that does not serve state 
interests, as it “may result in years of additional litigation and threaten the reopening of 
adoption proceedings and the vacation of the adoption”). 
12.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). 
13.  Id. at 658; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965); see also Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
14.  Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (finding that a statute granting child 
support to marital children while denying that support to nonmarital children violated the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
15.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-225.02 (2017) (instituting criminal penalties for failure 
to pay child support); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2017) (punishing failure to pay child support 
with fines and imprisonment); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 111.1 (2017) (treating failure to pay 
child support as civil contempt of court). 
16.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 46-225.02 (2017) (instituting criminal penalties for failure 
to pay child support); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:75 (2017) (punishing failure to pay child support 
with fines and imprisonment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-609 (2017) (“[T]he court may 
terminate the parental rights of a putative father . . . [when] a judicial determination is 
made . . . that the parent and child relationship does not exist.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 111.1 
(2017) (treating failure to pay child support as civil contempt of court).  
17.  Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2015, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Jan. 
5, 2017, at 8, https:// www.cdc.gov /nchs /data /nvsr /nvsr66 /nvsr66 _01 .pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y66Z-3ZML]. 
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Hispanic men than non-Hispanic white men father their first child 
in a non-marital relationship.18  Unmarried fathers, on average, 
are younger, less educated, and more likely to be unemployed 
than married fathers.19  Because of these factors, unmarried 
fathers are more vulnerable to ignorance of their legal rights and 
responsibilities and are less likely to have assistance of counsel in 
custody hearings than their middle-class, married counterparts.20 
This difference becomes particularly relevant in situations 
such as Lehr’s, where the father knows of a child’s existence, but, 
through no fault of his own, has no legally cognizable relationship 
with that child.  Had Lehr been educated about his responsibilities 
and registered as a putative father (rather than filing a petition for 
adoption), he might have obtained custody of his daughter.21 
This Comment purposes to explore ways in which the 
current “biology plus” test for determining existence of a paternal 
relationship disproportionately affects lower-income minority 
fathers who are unlikely to be fully aware of the legal hoops they 
must jump through to establish paternity.  Part II of this Comment 
provides necessary background on both the history of fathers’ 
rights and current child-rearing in the United States.  Part III lays 
out the development of the biology plus test.22  Part IV examines, 
 
18.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DATA BRIEF NO. 204, THREE DECADES OF NONMARITAL FIRST BIRTHS AMONG FATHERS 
AGED 15-44 IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2015), http:// www. cdc.gov /nchs /data /databriefs 
/db204.pdf [https://perma.cc/57SY-6ZQH]; see also GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF SINGLE FATHERS: A NINEFOLD INCREASE SINCE 1960, at 3 
(2013), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/07/single-fathers-07-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7VS-3PY2 ] (“[S]ingle fathers are typically less educated and 
less well-off than their married counterparts. They are also younger and less likely to be 
white.”). 
19.  OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 





%27%29&amp;r=1&amp;m=1 [https://perma.cc/9PRF -BEAZ]. 
20.  See, e.g., Theresa Amato, Opinion, Put Lawyers Where They’re Needed, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2015, at A25 (“Throughout the country, millions of low-income people have 
no access to free or affordable lawyers, even for life-altering civil matters like child-custody 
disputes . . . .”); Harry Reasoner, Finding New Ways to Give Access to Justice to Those Who 
Cannot Afford Lawyers, 79 TEX. B.J. 366, 366 (2016) (“Texas legal aid organizations can 
help only 10 percent of low-income Texans.”). 
21.  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983). 
22.  The biology plus test is one of the most widely-used tests for determining parental 
rights.  Other tests include a theory based solely on biological connection (now disfavored 
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in some detail, three ways in which the biology plus test 
disproportionately harms low-income fathers of color.  Part V 
discusses the implications of these issues and promotes continued 
refinement of the biology plus test in order to alleviate its negative 
effects. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
As with all areas of law, the societal conception of paternal 
rights has evolved throughout history as cultural values and 
structures have shifted.  This evolution continues in contemporary 
society, due in part to rapid changes in the demographic of the 
modern family. 
A. Historical Background 
Historically, fathers held significant rights over their 
children. Ancient Roman fathers had unequivocal paternal rights 
to custody of their children.23  Roman law utilized a proprietary 
theory of paternal rights—in other words, it did not contemplate 
the interests of the child in determining those rights, because it 
considered children property.24  The law automatically assumed a 
husband to be the father of his wife’s children, unless he “was 
sterile, impotent, or had no access to his wife during the period 
when conception occurred.”25  An unmarried man who fathered a 
child with a married woman had no recognized right to that 
child.26 
 
and generally used only in surrogacy situations), a “constructionist” view based on an 
implied contract between society and the parent, an “intention” theory, and the best interests 
of the child test (used mainly in divorce or foster care cases).  See, e.g., Dara E. Purvis, 
Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 222-27 
(2012).  Because this Comment deals with the rights of often-unintentional biological fathers, 
these other tests fall outside its scope.  In addition, this Comment focuses solely on the 
biology plus test’s impact on low-income unmarried fathers in adoption cases.  Situations in 
which a man seeks to rebut the marital presumption, as in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110 (1989), are outside the scope of this analysis. 
23.  Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville: Rethinking the Birth of 
Custody Law Under Patriarchy, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 247, 263 (1999) (stating that Roman 
fathers had, arguably, “the most extreme example of parental rights existing in a civilized 
and complex legal system. . . .”).  
24.  Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the 
Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223 (2002). 
25.  Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 47 (2003). 
26.  Id. 
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The marital presumption, based in a desire for social stability 
rather than genetic precision,27 extended throughout the Middle 
Ages and embedded itself into English common law.28  A child 
born outside of marriage belonged, legally, to no one,29 unless the 
biological father chose to legitimize him.30  Neither the biological 
mother nor the child could establish paternity on their own.31  
Thus, for much of Western history, a putative father could legally 
recognize, but had no legal obligation to, a nonmarital child.32  
This allowed men to legitimize or ignore any nonmarital children 
as they saw fit, with few, if any, repercussions.33  On the other 
hand, it placed the onus of support for nonmarital children solely 
on the mother.34 
This state of affairs slowly began to change.  In 1973, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized a child’s right to receive 
support from his or her father, regardless of the parents’ marital 
status.35  Rather than filius nullius, a baby born out of wedlock 
became a child of two parents, each of whom had responsibilities 
toward that child.36 
Additionally, a shift occurred in courts’ mindsets regarding 
disputes over parental rights, beginning with the Maryland High 
Court of Chancery’s 1830 decision Helms v. Franciscus.37  In 
Helms, the court created an exception to the traditional 
presumption of paternal custody after divorce, stating, 
[Although] in general, no Court can take from [a father] the 
custody and control of [his children] . . . even a Court of 
common law will not go so far as to . . . snatch [an infant] 
 
27.  Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 24, at 222. 
28.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446, *454-55. 
29.  Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 253 (1995) (“An 
illegitimate child was ‘filius nullius’—she had no legal relationship to anyone.”). 
30.  Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 24, at 223. 
31.  E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity 
Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10 (1992). 
32.  Id. (“[B]oth ancient and medieval civilizations protected the putative father to the 
detriment of the mother and child by refusing to force the father to recognize his true 
biological relationship to those children born out-of-wedlock.”).  
33.  See id.  
34.  See id. 
35.  See generally Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
36.  See Roberts, supra note 29, at 253. 
37.  2 Bland 519, 535-36 (Md. 1830). 
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from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and place it in the 
coarse hands of the father.38 
This signaled the beginning of a movement toward greater 
recognition of maternal rights and a corresponding decrease in a 
father’s rights toward his child.39 
It is worth noting that the tendency to award custody to 
fathers extended only to those married to the child’s mother.40  
Unmarried fathers experienced hostility and a general neglect of 
their rights by both the judicial and legislative branches of 
government.41  Many believed a putative father’s unmarried 
status automatically made him unfit to care for a child, while 
others assumed constitutional protections designed to safeguard 
parental rights did not apply to a father not married to his child’s 
mother.42 
The United States Supreme Court extended constitutional 
protection to the rights of unwed fathers in 1972.43  While the 
Court continues to uphold these constitutional rights, it predicates 
them on something more than merely a biological connection,44 a 
theory commonly called the “biology plus” test45 and discussed 
in detail in Part III of this Comment.46  However, the marital 
presumption still applies by statute in many states,47 and has been 
 
38.  Id. 
39.  Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. 
L. 423, 435 (1976). 
40.  Amy S. Haney, Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers in 
Georgia: In re Baby Girl Eason, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 591 (1989) (“Prior to 1972 an 
unwed father’s rights were virtually nonexistent.”). 
41.  See id. 
42.  See, e.g., In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
43.  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (rejecting as unconstitutional the state’s presumption that 
unmarried fathers—but not unmarried mothers—were unfit parents). 
44.  Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA 
L. REV. 637, 650-63 (1993); see generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).  However, 
unlike parental rights, parental obligations—most notably child support payments—may 
develop based solely on biology.  See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The 
History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 7-9 (2004).  
45.  Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise 
His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 975 (1992). 
46.  See infra Part III. 
47.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204 (2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2017); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (2017); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 195 (2017); ME. STAT. 
tit. 19, § 1881 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-17.2 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 
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upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court, even when the 
biological father has developed and maintained a relationship 
with his child.48 
B. Marriage and Child-Rearing Data 
Understanding the rights of unmarried fathers is especially 
important today in light of recent demographic trends involving 
marriage.49  Currently, 20% of American adults over age 25 have 
never been married,50 and those who do marry do so at older ages 
than in previous decades.51 A groom’s average age at first 
marriage increased from 23 in 1960 to 29 in 2012.52  Individuals 
without post-secondary education marry, on average, earlier than 
individuals with a college degree or higher.53  However, men with 
no post-secondary education are less likely than their counterparts 
with post-graduate degrees to marry at all.54  As a general rule, 
people with higher levels of education are more likely to get 
married and to stay married.55 
However, the lack of a marriage license does not mean an 
individual is necessarily “single.”56  Almost a quarter of 
 
26.26.116 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. § 891.41 (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504 
(West 2017).  
48.  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128-30 (1989) (upholding denial of 
paternal rights under state statute to biological father when the “mother is, at the time of the 
child’s conception and birth, married to, and cohabitating with, another man, both of whom 
wish to raise the child as the offspring of their union”).   
49.  See generally KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF 
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED AS VALUES, ECONOMICS, AND GENDER PATTERNS 
CHANGE (2014). 
50.  Id. at 4. 
51.  CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L 
HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 49, FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 
2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 1 (2012), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQM9-3TKZ]. 
52.  PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 4-5.  Over the same time period, women’s 
average ages at first marriage increased from 20 to 27. Id. 
53.  Wendy Wang, The Link Between a College Education and a Lasting Marriage, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 4, 2015), http:// www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/ 2015/ 12/ 
04/education-and-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/6AR7-YZX8]. 
54.  PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 9. 
55.  Alison Aughinbaugh et al., Marriage and Divorce: Patterns by Gender, Race, and 
Educational Attainment, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2013, at 12-14, https:// www.bls.gov/ 
opub/ mlr/ 2013/ article/ pdf/ marriage-and-divorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-
educational-attainment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD2G-QNEC]. 
56.  See PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 16. 
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unmarried young adults cohabitate.57  Those with no college 
education are more likely to cohabitate, and their cohabitations 
are less likely to result in marriage.58  Multiple factors contribute 
to this decline in marriage rates, including economic pressures,59 
changing social values,60 and a growing societal acceptance of 
non-marital cohabitation.61 
Individuals who have non-marital children are less likely to 
marry early, and their marriages are less likely to last.62  As the 
marriage rate declines, the number of non-marital children born 
each year tends, unsurprisingly, to increase.63  Around 40% of 
children—or 1.6 million babies64—born every year in the United 
States are born outside of marriage.65  While this represents a 
decrease in the non-marital birth rate since 2009,66 it is still high 
compared to the 28% recorded in 1990.67  Seventy percent of 
African-American, 66% of Native American, and 53% of 
Hispanic mothers bore their children outside of wedlock in 2015, 
compared to 29.2% of non-Hispanic white and 16% of Asian or 
Pacific Islander mothers.68 
Correspondingly, married fathers are more likely to be white 
than single fathers.69 According to a 2015 study conducted by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), from 2000 to 
 
57.  Id. 
58.  See CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L 
HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 64, FIRST PREMARITAL COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 3, 5 (2013), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL9A-UVLQ].  One of 
the most common reasons for cohabitation instead of marriage is lack of financial 
preparedness.  PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 19. 
59.  PARKER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7. 
60.  JILL DAUGHERTY & CASEY COPEN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REP. NO. 92, TRENDS IN ATTITUDES ABOUT MARRIAGE, 
CHILDBEARING, AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: UNITED STATES, 2002, 2006-2010, AND 2011-
2013, at 3-5 (2016), https:// www.cdc.gov/ nchs/ data/ nhsr/ nhsr092.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/25WN-5BEK]; see also LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 3. 
61.  DAUGHERTY & COPEN, supra note 60, at 4. 
62.  COPEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 6-8. 
63.  Marriage in America: The Fraying Knot, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21569433-americas-marriage-rate-fall ing-
and-its-out-wedlock-birth-rate-soaring-fraying [http://perma.cc/3T3K-Q3RN]. 
64.  Martin et al., supra note 17, at 46. 
65.  Id. at 8. 
66.  Id. 
67.  GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR. THE NEW 
DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN MOTHERHOOD 1 (2010). 
68.  Martin et al., supra note 17, at 46. 
69.  LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 2.  
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2009 36% of men fathered their first child outside of marriage.70  
While 39% of out-of-wedlock first children during this time had 
non-Hispanic white fathers, these men also made up an 
overwhelming majority of the population at the time.71  Thus, the 
number of non-marital first births to white fathers, while a high 
percentage of the total number of births, is statistically far lower 
than the prevalence of white men in the population at large would 
indicate.72  Conversely, 33% of non-marital first births occurred 
to Hispanic fathers, and 21% to African-American fathers,73 
despite these ethnic groups constituting 16% and 12% of the 
population, respectively.74 Sixty-six percent of African-American 
fathers had a non-marital first birth, compared to 54% of Hispanic 
fathers and 24% of non-Hispanic white fathers.75  Thus, compared 
to the population at large, unmarried fathers are far more likely to 
be men of color.76 
Women with lower levels of education are more likely to 
become pregnant early in a cohabitating relationship than those 
with a college education.77  Thus, women without college degrees 
are more likely to have nonmarital children than those with 
college degrees.78  While there are few statistical studies on the 
education levels of putative fathers, men tend to marry women of 
similar educational attainment.79  As less-educated individuals are 
less likely to transition from cohabitation to marriage, they are 
more likely to give birth to non-marital children.80  Because 
education levels and marital status correlate with income, these 
individuals are more likely to fall into lower income strata.81 
 
70.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 1. 
71.  Id. at 4.  72% of the American population identified as non-Hispanic white in the 
2010 census.  KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND 
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (2011), https:// www.census.gov/ content/ dam/ Census/ 
library/ publications/2011/dec/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY9N-EPVF]. 
72.  See id.  
73.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 4. 
74.  HUMES ET AL., supra note 71, at 4. 
75.  NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., supra note 18, at 2. 
76.  See id. 
77.  COPEN ET AL., supra note 58, at 6. 
78.  See id. 
79.  Richard V. Reeves, Opinion, Sex, Race, Education and the Marriage Gap, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/sex-race-education-and-mar riage-
gap-322591 [https://perma.cc/95MA-R9RB].  
80.  Id.; see also COPEN ET AL., supra note 58, at 6. 
81.  Aughinbaugh et al., supra note 55, at 3. 
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Significantly, studies have shown that marital status and a 
high income level often perpetuate one another,82 meaning that 
marriage can often be an indicator of economic prosperity.83  This 
is partially because the highly-educated are more likely to marry, 
and generally marry each other, resulting in two individuals with 
above-average earning capacity consolidating their economic 
gains into one household.84  Because college graduates are 
overwhelmingly white,85 and because Americans tend to marry 
within their own ethnicities,86 this forces unmarried parents of 
color to the lower levels of the economic strata.87 
III.  THE BIOLOGY PLUS TEST 
The biology plus test, one of the most common standards for 
parental rights in the American legal system, requires that an 
unmarried father demonstrate his paternity through some 
affirmative indicator outside of a biological relationship.88  In 
other words, an unmarried biological father must take on the 
“responsibilities of parenthood” before he receives parental 
rights.89  He may do so by marrying the biological mother, 
financially supporting the child, developing an emotional bond 
with the child, or otherwise “acting like a husband, as well as like 
a father.”90 
Generally, the biology plus test relies on statutory 
obligations, rather than subjective opinions, in determining 
whether a putative father has established a relationship with his 
biological child.  State statutes, often based on the Uniform 
Parentage Act,91 list specific ways in which a man may establish 
 
82.  Id. 
83.  See id. 
84.  Reeves, supra note 79. 
85.  THOMAS SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2016-014, 
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2015, at 635 tbl.322.20 (2016). 
86.  See WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF INTERMARRIAGE 
5 (2012), http:// assets.pewresearch.org/ wp-content/ uploads/ sites/ 3/ 2012/02/SDT-
Intermarriage-II.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YPW-5429]. 
87.  Reeves, supra note 79. 
88.  Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 404-05 (2012). 
89.  Id. at 404; see also Dolgin, supra note 44, at 671 (stating that fatherhood depends 
on social relationships with the child and the mother as well as biology). 
90.  Murray, supra note 88, at 405. 
91.  Portions of the Uniform Parentage Act have been adopted by multiple states.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002), http:// www. 
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paternity.92  These include marriage to the mother,93 
acknowledgment of the child as his own,94 adoption,95 
adjudication of paternity,96 and, where available, filing with the 
state putative father registry.97 
A jurisdiction relying on the biology plus test supposedly 
acts in an objective manner, as, when a putative father contests an 
adoption proceeding, attempting to assert his rights to a child, the 
court can simply look at the applicable statute and determine 
whether the father has fulfilled the necessary obligations.98  If the 
father has had no contact with the child, provided no financial 
support, and did not enter his name in the putative father registry, 
the court will most likely conclude that he has no paternal 
relationship with that child.99  Thus, the court can safely terminate 




 A. Judicial Development 
The Supreme Court’s development of the biology plus test 
began in 1972, when the Court decided Stanley v. Illinois.100  The 
plaintiff, Peter Stanley, lost custody of his two minor children 
under a state law that placed nonmarital children in state custody 
at their mother’s death.101  The law required a finding of parental 
unfitness before terminating the rights of married fathers or 
 
uniformlaws.org/ shared/ docs/ parentage/ upa_ final_ 2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSZ-
TZZN]; see also, e.g., Uniform Parentage Act, TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 160.001 to 160.763 
(West 2017); Uniform Parentage Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.011 to 26.26-914 (2017). 
92.  See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
93.  OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(4)(a) (2017). 
94.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-120 (2015); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-302 
(2017) (authorizing unmarried fathers to voluntarily complete forms acknowledging 
paternity of their newborns). 
95.  GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-22(a)(2)(A) (2017). 
96.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172a (2017). 
97.  FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2017).  
98.  See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
99.  See generally, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
100.  405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
101.  Id. at 646.  While Peter and Joan Stanley lived together off and on for eighteen 
years, they were not married at the time of Joan’s death.  Id.  The statutes in question included 
as parents only “the father and mother of a legitimate child . . . the natural mother of an 
illegitimate child, and . . . any adoptive parent.”  In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 
1970), rev’d sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
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unmarried mothers, but not those of unmarried fathers.102  Peter 
Stanley challenged the custody declaration on the grounds that 
termination of his parental rights without determination of his 
parental fitness violated the Equal Protection Clause.103 
The Supreme Court held that refusing parental rights to a 
father based solely on his marital status violated both the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.104  Rather, the Court stated that, by caring for his 
children, and thus fulfilling the traditional role of a father for 
eighteen years, Peter had established a paternal relationship 
subject to constitutional protections.105  Because the state court 
terminated Peter Stanley’s rights based solely on his marital 
status, despite his active role in his children’s lives, the Supreme 
Court found its ruling unconstitutional.106 
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott, the Supreme Court 
again took up a case regarding an unmarried father’s parental 
rights.107  Leon Quilloin, who had fathered a child with Ardell 
Walcott eleven years prior, sought to prevent Ardell’s new 
husband, Randall, from adopting that child.108  Although state law 
at the time required the consent of both biological parents to the 
adoption of a marital child, only the mother had to consent to the 
adoption of a nonmarital child unless the father legitimized that 
child.109  The Court found that Leon had no constitutionally-
protected parental interest.110 
In Quilloin, as in Stanley, the Court based its reasoning on 
the father’s conduct toward the child.  It reasoned that a father 
does not automatically have a right to his biological child merely 
because that child exists, but must actively seek to establish a 
relationship in order to obtain paternal rights.111  Because Leon 
Quilloin never had nor sought custody of his child, never 
 
102.  In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d at 815, rev’d sub nom. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
103.  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
104.  Id. at 657-58 (“[The state] insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s 
unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due 
Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the 
issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.”). 
105.  Id. at 646, 654-56, 658. 
106.  Id.; see also Dolgin, supra note 44, at 650-51. 
107.  434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
108.  Id. at 247. 
109.  Id. at 248-49. 
110.  Id. at 247, 252-53. 
111.  Id. at 255. 
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legitimized the child (despite having eleven years to do so), and 
received full notice and a hearing prior to the adoption, the Court 
held that he had failed to establish the requisite paternal 
relationship.112  In other words, though Leon had developed some 
relationship with his child, it was not a significant enough 
relationship to satisfy the Court.113 
The Supreme Court took up the issue of unmarried fathers’ 
rights again the next year.114 The plaintiff in Caban v. 
Mohammed, Abdiel Caban, sought to prevent the stepparent 
adoption of his two biological children.115  Abdiel and the 
children’s mother, Maria Mohammed, lived together for five 
years, during which both parents contributed to the children’s 
financial support.116  Maria then married another man, but Abdiel 
continued to see his children weekly.117  Eventually, both Maria 
and Abdiel, along with their new spouses, petitioned for 
adoption.118  Following a state statute, which required only the 
consent of the mother to adoption of a nonmarital child,119 a New 
York Surrogate granted Maria’s petition and terminated Abdiel’s 
parental rights.120 
The Court echoed its decision in Stanley by declaring the 
state law unconstitutional on the grounds that it “treat[ed] 
unmarried parents differently according to their sex.”121  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Powell stated that, while Abdiel’s new 
wife could not adopt his children without Maria’s consent, Abdiel 
could only block Maria’s husband from adopting his children if 
he proved such an adoption was not in the children’s best 
interest.122 
 
112.  Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
115.  Id. at 381-82. 
116.  Id. at 382. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. at 383. 
119.  The law in question, Section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Code, 
stated: “[C]onsent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving 
parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether 
adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock. . . .” Caban, 441 U.S. at 385. 
120.  Id. at 383-84. 
121.  Id. at 388. 
122.  Id. at 388. 
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As part of the children’s best interest, the Court looked at the 
relationship between Abdiel and his children.123  Applying the 
biology plus test, it found that Abdiel had clearly established a 
parental relationship with his children because his name appeared 
on their birth certificates as their father, and because he had 
provided financial support to, and lived with, the children as their 
father for five years.124  Having established a parental 
relationship, Abdiel obtained the corresponding rights.125  Thus, 
based on Abdiel’s actions, rather than the biological connection 
between him and his children, the Supreme Court found he had a 
constitutional interest in continuing his paternal relationship.126  
The Court reversed the grant of Maria’s adoption petition.127 
Four years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lehr v. 
Robertson reaffirmed that, in the Court’s mind, a father’s rights 
are not predicated solely on biology.128  While Jonathan Lehr 
attempted to locate his daughter, provided emotional support to 
her mother, Lorraine, throughout the pregnancy, and offered 
financial support that Lorraine rejected,129 the Court held that 
these actions alone did not establish a parental relationship.130  
Rather, the Court stated that Jonathan “never established a 
substantial relationship with his daughter” because he failed to 
marry Lorraine or live with Baby Jessica—two traditional, 
conduct-based markers of paternity.131  In addition, the Court for 
the first time considered the role of putative father registries, 
stating that, despite Jonathan’s failure to file with the New York 
registry, the very existence of the registry provided adequate 
protection to his rights.132 
 
123.  Id. at 389. 
124.  Caban, 441 U.S. at 382, 389. 
125.  Id. at 389-93. 
126.  Id. at 394 (“The effect of New York’s classification is to discriminate against 
unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant 
paternal interest in the child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying 
unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a 
concerned judgment as to the fate of their children. Section 111 both excludes some loving 
fathers from full participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at 
the same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of 
fathers.”). 
127.  Id.  
128.  See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983). 
129.  See id. at 269-70 (White, J. dissenting). 
130.  Id. at 251-56. 
131.  Id. at 251-52, 267. 
132.  Id. at 250-55, 263-64. 
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B. States’ Responses 
Following the Court’s decision in Stanley, in 1973 the 
Uniform Law Commission drafted the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA).133  The UPA, designed to recognize unmarried fathers’ 
rights and stop differentiation between marital and nonmarital 
fathers, integrated the biology plus test as a key tenet.134  
Specifically, the UPA focused on paternal acknowledgement, 
stating that a man who lives with his child and “openly holds out 
the child as his natural child” has established a paternal 
relationship with that child.135 
Often looking to the UPA for guidance, states began 
adopting the biology plus test through legislation.136  State 
statutes generally require an unmarried biological mother’s 
consent to the adoption of her child, but only require the 
biological father’s consent if he meets certain guidelines.137  
Significantly, these statutes often ignore the father’s subjective 
intent toward the child in favor of how that intent manifests 
through the father’s conduct.138  Such manifestations include 
financial support, visitation, official acknowledgement of 
paternity, or a significant relationship with the child’s mother.139 
Enrollment in a putative father registry is one common 
method of ensuring a father meets the statutory requirements of 
the biology plus test.  Such registries are encouraged in the 
 
133.  Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 1185, 1195 (2016). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)). 
136.  See, e.g., Kevin T. Lytle, Note, Rock-a-bye Baby: When Determining How and 
Where the Cradle Should Fall, Nebraska “Blows It”—An Examination of Unwed Fathers’ 
Rights Regarding Their Children and Nebraska’s Infringement of Those Rights, 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 180, 205 (1995) (“Scared into action by the implications of the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stanley, in September of 1974, a committee of attorneys and adoption 
agency representatives began work on a legislative bill that would revise the Nebraska 
adoption statutes. At the time of the Stanley decision, the Nebraska adoption statutes 
provided no rights for an unwed father.”). 
137.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 63.062(2) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(b) (2017); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4)‒(5) (2017).  
138.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4) (2017) (“The subjective intent of the 
father . . . does not preclude a determination that the father failed to maintain substantial and 
continuous or repeated contact with the child.”). 
139.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 63.062(2) (2017); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4)-(5) (2017). 
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UPA140 and currently exist in at least half of the states.141  A man 
may proactively file with a putative father registry regarding any 
woman with whom he has had a physical relationship, whether or 
not he knows she is pregnant.142  If he does so, he is then entitled 
to receive notice of any proceedings within that state that may 
jeopardize his paternal rights.143  Putative father registries offer a 
way around unilateral deception by the mother and also serve to 
provide courts with a means to reach the father in the event of an 
adoption proceeding.144  For these reasons, putative father 
registries are an excellent resource for unmarried fathers who, 
through no fault of their own, have not been able to establish a 
relationship with their child or otherwise fulfill statutory 
requirements. 
IV.  THREE CRITIQUES OF THE BIOLOGY PLUS 
CONDUCT TEST 
In theory, the biology plus test is an effective way of 
determining paternal rights.  Not only does it provide a clear 
standard for courts in determining when they may legally 
terminate paternal rights, but it promotes faster adoption of young 
children who might otherwise spend months, or years, in parental 
limbo.145  If the biological father is not in the child’s life and has 
not filed with a putative father registry, the court may more easily 
terminate his parental rights and enter an adoption decree.146  This 
not only provides the children in question with stability, but 
 
140.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 401-02 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).  
141.  These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-36,201(a)(7) 
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 48.025 (2017); CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
UNMARRIED FATHERS 2 (2014), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BF6W-EEM H].  
142.  See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1039 (2002). 
143.  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 141, at 2.  
144.  Most putative father registries require at least the father’s name and current 
address.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10C-1 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-702 (2014); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172a (2017). 
145.  See Diane S. Kaplan, The Baby Richard Amendments and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., Winter 2002, at 2-12. 
146.  See id. 
2018 LOW-INCOME FATHERS, ADOPTION 1129 
promotes judicial efficiency.  However, theory is often much 
different than practice, and such is sometimes the case in this area. 
The biology plus test is not perfect.  It can, in fact, lead to 
arguably unjust results.  The test emphasizes judicial efficiency 
over paternal rights.147  Judicial efficiency is certainly important, 
especially in cases regarding the guardianship and living 
arrangements of young, impressionable children.  Parental rights, 
however, are protected by the Constitution and should not be 
sacrificed in the name of efficiency.148  This Comment will 
address three particular problems with the biology plus test as 
applied to low-income, unmarried fathers: lack of notice, reliance 
on putative father registries, and lack of uniformity between the 
various states.149 
A. Lack of Notice 
One criticism of the biology plus test is the lack of notice it 
provides unmarried fathers regarding their rights and 
responsibilities.  While it is certainly true that “ignorance of the 
law is no excuse,”150 it is also true that parenthood is a 
fundamental constitutional right.151  In contrast to adoptive 
parents, the majority of whom are well above the poverty level,152 
 
147.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (advocating 
the biology plus test as a means of promoting faster adoptions). 
148.  See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972). 
149.  A detailed analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the biology plus test’s 
application to low-income fathers of color is outside the scope of this Comment.  It is worth 
noting, however, that such issues do exist.  Because parental rights are protected by the 
Constitution, any government action that curtails these rights potentially raises constitutional 
issues.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).  This particular 
application of the biology plus test raises Equal Protection and Due Process Clause issues.  
(While the Supreme Court has rejected claims that the biology plus theory violates the Equal 
Protection Clause based on gender, despite its overt differentiation on the basis of sex, the 
fact that the test’s application disadvantages men of color raises race-based Equal Protection 
issues.  See generally, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).). 
150.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
151.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923). 
152.  JO JONES, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF 
WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18-44 YEARS OF 
AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 11-12, 23 (2008), https:// www. cdc.gov/ nchs/ data/ 
series/sr_23 /sr23_027.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6BC-4GX8]. 
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a majority of unmarried fathers are low-income.153  Since income 
level correlates with education, these men are less likely to know 
where to find information about their legal responsibilities—if, 
indeed, they realize they have such responsibilities at all.154  Low-
income putative fathers are also unlikely to possess resources 
necessary to engage legal representation or conduct an exhaustive 
investigation of their rights.155 
B. Putative Father Registries 
Putative father registries are state-established databases that 
allow a man who has had a physical relationship with a woman to 
place his name on file as a potential father of any children that 
woman may bear.  The registries may serve to alleviate some of 
the weaknesses in the biology plus test.  There are, however, 
significant weaknesses in the registries themselves.  First, the 
registries are only effective if fathers file with them and, 
unfortunately, many unmarried men simply do not know the 
registries exist.  For instance, between 1989 and 2016, Arkansas’ 
registry recorded only 2,110 filings.156  In 2004, only forty-seven 
putative fathers registered in Florida, while 90,000 non-marital 
children were born in the state that same year.157  Virginia’s 
registry, established in 2007, had sixty-four filings in its first year 
compared with 38,000 out-of-wedlock births statewide.158 
Because most unmarried fathers come from lower 
socioeconomic strata, it stands to reason that the majority of those 
 
153.  In a Princeton and Columbia University study of 3,700 unmarried parents of 
children born between 1998 and 2000, only 21.5 % of the fathers earned more than $25,000 
per year.  Marcia Carlson et al., Unmarried but Not Absent: Fathers’ Involvement with 
Children After a Nonmarital Birth 30 tbl.1 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working 
Paper No. 05-07-FF, 2005). 
154.  Employment Projections: Unemployment Rates and Earnings by Educational 
Attainment, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Oct. 24, 2017), https: //www. bls.gov/ emp/ ep_ 
table_ 001.htm [https://perma.cc/N6EF-E3TD]. 
155.  Amato, supra note 20. 
156.  Ellen Thalls, State Registry Could Protect Unmarried Fathers’ Rights, 5NEWS 
ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://5newsonline.com/2016/01/28/state-registry-could-
protect-unmarried-fathers-rights-2/ [https://perma.cc/MB75-SCR2].  This number includes 
“duplicate forms and children who are now over 18.” Id. 
157.  Timothy L. Arcaro, No More Secret Adoptions: Providing Unwed Biological 
Fathers with Actual Notice of the Florida Putative Father Registry, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 
453 (2008). 
158.  Ashley Hottle, Virginia’s Putative Father Registry: Three Years Later, FAM. L. 
NEWS (Va. State Bar Family Law Section, Richmond, Va.), Winter 2010, at 8-9, 
http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections/family/winter2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZMG -H44X]. 
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who fail to file with the registries are also low-income.  While 
some registries, such as Florida’s and South Carolina’s, can be 
located with a simple internet search and have online 
registration,159 others are difficult to locate and complicated to file 
with.  Kansas has no information on its putative father registry on 
its official government websites.  Rather, a father must locate the 
applicable section in the Department for Children and Families’ 
600-page Policy and Procedure manual, informing him that he 
must call the Office of Child Support Services, who will then take 
the ambiguous action of “direct[ing]” him to add his name to the 
registry.160  
This less-than-accessible state of affairs is likely one reason 
that, in the twenty-five years between 1994 and 2016, only five 
men filed with the Kansas registry.161  The combination of 
ignorance of the registries’ existence and lack of resources to 
investigate, which are both common to most low-income fathers, 
makes it likely that such fathers comprise the majority of the men 
who have failed to file with the registries.162 
The drafters of the UPA originally recognized that the 
outcomes dictated by a registry can be less than ideal, stating that 
the registries work only in intrastate situations, are based on 
“unsupported claims,” could be used by an unscrupulous potential 
father to extort the child’s mother, and “provide a simple (albeit 
‘hard-nosed’ and potentially unjust) solution when a father fails 
to register . . . .”163  However, in 2002, the drafters changed their 
position and “accept[ed] the importance and utility of a parentage 
 
159.  Putative Father Registry, FLA. HEALTH, http://www.floridahealth.gov/ 
certificates/certificates/birth/Putative_Father/index.html [https://perma.cc/98LP-C2 YL] 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2017); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Responsible Father Registry, SC.GOV, 
https://ssl.sc.gov/DSSFatherRegistry/FatherReg/RegIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/L9NG-
5DKL] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). 
160.  KAN. DEP’T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, PREVENTION & PROT. SERVS., POLICY 
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 457 (Jan. 2018), http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/ 
Documents/PPM_Forms/Policy_and_Procedure_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH 9 -
5UYX] (“To add a father to the registry, please contact Child Services Support [sic] and they 
will direct you.”). 
161.  Amanda Palumbo & Angie Ricono, Independence Father Denied Custody After 
Loophole Adoption, KCTV NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:14 PM), http:// www.kctv5. com/ story/ 
31050293/ independence- father- denied- custody- after- loophole- adoption 
[https://perma.cc/L2CH-BCFE]. 
162.  In contrast, adoptive parents are more likely to know their rights and how to 
protect them, as they are better able to hire legal counsel.  Supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  
163.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 4 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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registry.”164  This change of heart stemmed not from a goal of 
preserving fathers’ rights, but one of providing faster and easier 
adoptions.165  Specifically, the UPA’s drafters asserted a goal of 
providing quick and efficient adoption proceedings in cases 
involving infants younger than one year.166 
Because of their reduced access to legal resources and lower 
levels of education, low-income unmarried fathers are more likely 
to fall prey to the problems inherent in the biology plus test, 
including the putative father registries.167  Thus, while it’s 
efficient nature makes it appealing to courts and potential 
adoptive parents, the biology plus test fails to preserve the rights 
of the most vulnerable members of one of the populations it 
should protect. 
The putative father registries are a prime example of 
promoting efficiency at the expense of paternal rights.  They 
allow courts to terminate paternal rights in situations where the 
biological father has both the means and a desire to parent his 
child.168  Such actions disproportionately affect low-income 
fathers—and, by inference, fathers of color—at the enrichment of 
middle- and upper-class white families.169 
C. Lack of Uniformity Between States 
Variations from state to state in the biology plus test’s 
requirements constitute a third weakness in the test. Because 
many states require strict compliance with their own statutes and 
do not give credit to actions that fathers have taken to protect their 
rights in other states, these variations can lead to undesirable 
situations. This is particularly true when it comes to the state 
putative father registries. 
 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id.  
167.  See supra notes 150-66 and accompanying text. 
168.  See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Manzanares v. Byington (In 
re Adoption of Baby B.), 308 P.3d 382 (Utah 2012).  O’Dea v. Olea, 217 P.3d 704 (Utah 
2009). 
169.  While minority populations are disproportionately represented in the unmarried 
father demographic, adoptive families are more likely than the general population to be 
white.  See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE 
PARENTS 13 (2009).  Thus, a test that prioritizes the interests of adoptive families over the 
interests of the biological father disproportionately disfavors minorities. 
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While low-income fathers are unlikely to realize the 
registries exist in the first place, those who do register in one state 
are likely to believe that doing so protects their rights in all states. 
However, because the registries are run by individual states, each 
with its own set of rules and deadlines, that initial registry only 
protects his rights within that initial state.170  If Jack registers in 
State A as a putative father for Jill’s child, Jill merely has to move 
to State B and put the child up for adoption there in order to 
prevent Jack from receiving notice.  Thus, even if a man enrolls 
his name in his state’s putative father registry, there is no 
guarantee that his rights will be protected. 
Such a situation took place in Manzanares v. Byington (In re 
Adoption of Baby B.),171 when Robert Manzanares’ ex-girlfriend, 
Carie Terry, left their home state of Colorado under false 
pretenses and gave birth to their daughter in Utah.172  Despite 
knowing that Robert wished to keep the child, and without 
informing him of her birth, Ms. Terry “executed a consent to 
adoption in Utah” relinquishing Baby B. to her brother and sister-
in-law.173  Even though Robert had complied with Colorado 
requirements, filed a paternity petition in Colorado, and 
consistently opposed putting his daughter up for adoption while 
expressing his desire to parent her, the Utah court still terminated 
his parental rights.174  After an extensive legal battle lasting 
several years, Robert finally gained partial custody rights to his 
daughter, but the adoptive parents maintained physical 
custody.175  It is worth noting that Robert’s fight for his parental 
 
170.  See, e.g., infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text. 
171.  308 P.3d 382 (Utah 2012). 
172.  Id. at 386-87.  Utah’s adoption laws did not require consent from an unmarried 
biological father who had not complied with strict statutory requirements unless he did not 
know the mother resided in Utah and fulfilled paternity requirements in the mother’s 
previous state of residence or the state of conception before the mother consented to 
adoption.  See id. at 389-90.  
173.  Id. at 387. 
174.  See id. at 386-87.  
175.  Brooke Adams, Father Wins Role in Life of Daughter Being Raised by Utah 
Couple, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://archive. 
sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/57648198-78/manzanares-utah-judge-case.html .csp 
[https://perma.cc/WC73-CHYJ].  In a small victory for Robert Manzanares, the Colorado 
judge who issued the ruling at least denied the adoptive parents—the Byingtons—requested 
child support.  Id.  Utah has since passed a law requiring birth mothers who have not lived 
in the state at least ninety days to “file with the court, a declaration regarding each potential 
birth father” and to “search the putative father registry” of states where she conceived the 
baby or lived while pregnant.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110.5(1) (West 2017). The mother 
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rights cost nearly $250,000—an amount far beyond the reach of 
most unmarried fathers.176 
In addition, the lack of uniformity between states means that 
the biology plus test’s requirements are not as objective as they 
may at first appear. The interstate statutory variations and 
nebulous obligations in those statutes—such as “fair and 
reasonable” financial support177 or a “significant . . . 
relationship . . . with the [child]”178—leave room for broad 
judicial interpretation. This is especially significant because 
adoptive households are more likely to be conventional, two-
parent households, which are traditionally considered more 
stable.179  In addition, the expense associated with adoption 
procedures results in most adoptive families placing well above 
the poverty line.180  Because children raised in higher-income 
households receive both tangible and intangible benefits a lower-
income family cannot provide, judges will often (consciously or 
unconsciously) favor more wealthy parties in a parental rights 
determination case.181 This, coupled with a shortage of newborns 
available for adoption,182 could potentially lead to wealthier 
individuals using the judicial system to strong-arm poor fathers 
into handing over their children.183 
V.  MOVING AHEAD 
 
must then inform an interested or unaware putative father that she plans to put the child up 
for adoption in Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110.5(3) (West 2017). 
176.  Robert Manzanares, Illegal Adoption of Kaia: Donations to Legal Fund, 
http://illegaladoption.com/donations-to-legal-fund/ [https://perma.cc/E3U5-CF9D] (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
177.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(4) (2017). 
178.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206(a)(2)(F) (2015). 
179.  VANDIVERE, ET AL., supra note 169, at 17. 
180.  Id. at 9, 15.  One adoption agency estimates the 2015-16 cost of a private, agency-
assisted domestic newborn adoption at between $34,000 and $38,000. How Much Does It 
Cost to Adopt a Child?, AM. ADOPTIONS, http://www.american adoptions.com/ adopt/ why_ 
does_ private_ adoption_ cost_ so_ much_ money [https://per ma.cc/YX39-HWRT] (last 
visited Jan 6, 2017). 
181.  These benefits are sometimes referred to as “cultural capital.”  See generally, e.g., 
Mads Meier Jaeger, Equal Access by Unequal Outcomes: Cultural Capital and Educational 
Choice in a Meritocratic Society, 87 SOC. FORCES 1943 (2009). 
182.  Types of Adoptions, NAT’L ADOPTION CTR., http://www.adopt.org/types-
adoptions [https://perma.cc/8NLJ-67EN] (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
183.  In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill. 1994) (Heiple, J., writing in 
support of the denial of rehearing). “We must remember that the purpose of an adoption is 
to provide a home for a child, not a child for a home.”  Id. at 190. 
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Although the biology plus test has its weaknesses, it remains 
a viable test because it allows judicial efficiency while still 
providing some measure of protection to unmarried fathers’ 
rights. Until legislators or the Supreme Court develop a better test, 
lawmakers should continue to refine the existing test.  A number 
of minor changes would alleviate some of the harms while still 
maintaining the benefits of the test. 
A. Uniformity 
Ideally, the test’s requirements should be standardized. 
Current law requires unmarried fathers to comply with fifty sets 
of rules in order to protect their rights in all fifty states. 
Legislatures could both protect paternal rights and increase 
judicial efficiency by enacting a standard set of rules governing 
termination of paternal rights.  While passage of a national law 
might be the most effective means of achieving this goal, 
legislating family law matters has typically been the province of 
the states.  Since states should be free to craft their own laws, the 
goal should be uniformity among the states, rather than a federal 
paternal rights bill. 
State laws should include several facets.184  They should 
provide protection for unmarried fathers against fraud by birth 
mothers, as in the Manzanares’ case.  Such protections might 
include crediting out-of-state fathers for complying with the 
relevant laws in their home states.  State laws should also 
provide—and many already do provide—actual notice 
requirements, ensuring that an unmarried father knows his child 
may be adopted.185  In addition, in newborn adoption cases, states 
should allow a reasonable response period after the child’s birth 
during which an unaware father may assert his rights. 
B. Education 
Some have lobbied for implementation of a national putative 
father registry.186  While this would eliminate the interstate 
 
184.  Some states have already enacted laws providing these protections. See, e.g., 
supra note 175. 
185.  Id. 
186.  See generally Beck, supra note 142; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121.5 
(West 2017) (creating a “Compact for Interstate Sharing of Putative Father Registry 
Information”). 
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adoption problem, it would still be subject to the other 
weaknesses posed by the existing registry system.  In addition, 
Congress has traditionally left family law matters to the states, 
and deviating from this tradition would likely cause an uproar. 
In order to eliminate the glaring lack-of-notice problem 
posed by putative father registries, states—or the federal 
government—should institute an informational campaign 
designed to raise awareness about the registries.  This could take 
the form of anything from television advertisements to billboards 
to awareness marches, but might be most effective long-term if 
implemented as part of public school sexual education classes. 
This proposal would certainly require both financial and 
human resources, which are often in short supply in the 
governmental realm.  However, it would also provide education 
to those who do not have the knowledge or time to self-educate 
about their rights, and who are often unable to seek legal advice. 
Such education would likely lead to a greater number of putative 
fathers complying with the necessary requirements for 
establishing their rights, thus promoting judicial efficiency by 
reducing the number of cases requiring a judicial determination 
of whether the father adequately protected his rights. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The current state of the paternal rights of unmarried fathers 
in the United States leaves much to be desired.  Low-income 
fathers, disproportionately men of color, bear the brunt of this 
suboptimal state of affairs.  While many states have procedures 
for establishing paternity, low-income fathers are unlikely to 
know of these procedures.  Because of this, they are more likely 
than their middle- and upper-class counterparts to have their 
parental rights involuntarily terminated.  In addition, these 
fathers’ economic and marital status may give rise to unconscious 
prejudice against them when judges apply the subjective aspects 
of the biology plus test. 
These issues are symptomatic of broader social issues—
most notably the vestiges of institutionalized racism, and societal 
prejudice against nontraditional families.  Only an understanding 
of how the test disadvantages the vulnerable individuals it should 
protect can produce a test better calculated to address the issues 
at hand. 
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